\u3cb\u3eAndrew P. Vance Memorial Writing Competition Winner:\u3c/b\u3e Acquiring a European Taste for Geographical Indications by Waggoner, Justin M.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 33 | Issue 2 Article 16
2008
Andrew P. Vance Memorial Writing Competition
Winner: Acquiring a European Taste for
Geographical Indications
Justin M. Waggoner
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Justin M. Waggoner, Andrew P. Vance Memorial Writing Competition Winner: Acquiring a European Taste for Geographical Indications,
33 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2008).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol33/iss2/16
ACQUIRING A EUROPEAN TASTE FOR 
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
n a handful of Italian provinces, Parmigiano-Reggiano undergoes 
several labor-intensive processes that culminate in the creation of a 
large wheel of cheese that must be aged for at least twelve months.1 The 
final product has a distinctive flavor that is “full and fruity with a salty 
tang.”2 Although the technology has changed, the method of producing 
Parmigiano-Reggiano has remained consistent for more than eight hun-
dred years.3 
Kraft Foods (“Kraft”) began producing Parmesan Cheese, its own ver-
sion of Parmigiano-Reggiano, in the United States in 1945.4 Kraft’s 
product has many of the same ingredients and uses as Parmigiano-
Reggiano, but there are several notable differences. Unlike Parmigiano-
Reggiano, Parmesan Cheese is mass-produced in large factories5 and is 
only aged for about ten months.6 Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese is sold in 
fresh wedges, while Parmesan Cheese is grated into a dry, powder-like 
substance and packaged in plastic or cardboard tubes.7 
Parmigiano-Reggiano producers8 are dismayed by Kraft’s product 
name of Parmesan Cheese (“Parmesan” is French for “Parmigiano”—
                                                                                                             
 1. For a more detailed description of how Parmigiano-Reggiano is produced, see 
Consorzio del Formaggio Parmigiano-Reggiano, Production Standard, http://www. 
parmigiano-reggiano.it/sotto_sezione/14288/Production_Standard.aspx?newlang=7 (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
 2. JUDY RIDGWAY, THE CHEESE COMPANION: THE CONNOISSEUR’S GUIDE 174 
(1999). 
 3. See Consorzio del Formaggio Parmigiano-Reggiano, http://www.parmigiano-
reggiano.it/index.html?l=2 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) (follow “800 Years of Excellence” 
hyperlink) [hereinafter Parmigiano-Reggiano Web Site]. 
 4. Kraft Grated Parmesan History, http://www.kraftfoods.com/KraftParm/allAbout 
KraftParm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
 5. JULIET HARBUTT, CHEESE: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO OVER 300 CHEESES OF 
DISTINCTION 110 (1999). 
 6. Libby Quaid, Kraft Wants to Speed the Making of Parmesan, but Purists Cry 
Foul, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 9, 2006, at 3. 
 7. See RIDGWAY, supra note 2, at 176. Kraft’s Grate-It-Fresh, which allows the user 
to grate his own Parmesan Cheese and was introduced in 2006, is an exception. See Kraft 
Grated Parmesan History, supra note 4. 
 8. There are approximately 450 dairy farms that produce the milk that is essential for 
Parmigiano-Reggiano. See Parmigiano-Reggiano Web Site, supra note 3 (follow “Dair-
ies” hyperlink). These dairies are located not only in the province of Parma, but also in 
the nearby provinces of Modena, Reggio Emilia, Bologna, and Mantua. See id. 
I 
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both mean “of Parma.”).9 These producers maintain that Parmigiano-
Reggiano (or parmesan cheese) can only be produced in Parma and other 
nearby provinces because the cheese’s quality and methods of production 
are linked with the land and cannot be replicated in other parts of the 
world.10 Parmigiano-Reggiano producers also argue that foreign produc-
ers of parmesan cheese are free riding on Parmigiano-Reggiano’s tradi-
tional product name.11 
More specifically, the Parmigiano-Reggiano producers believe that 
Kraft is infringing their product’s geographical indication (“GI”).12 GIs, 
which constitute a form of intellectual property (“IP”), are “indications 
which identify a good as originating in the territory of a [World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”)] Member, or a region or locality in that territory, 
where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is 
essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”13 
The European Communities (“EC”) favors strong GI protection.14 In 
fact, in the EC, Kraft is now prevented from labeling its product as 
“Parmesan.”15 However, the United States claims the EC is asking too 
much in its demands for GI protection.16 
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate why the United States 
should acquire a European outlook on GIs and enhance GI protection 
under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”). Part I of the Article discusses the history and scope of 
pre-TRIPS multilateral agreements on GIs. A detailed account of TRIPS 
provisions governing GI protection is included in Part II. Part III de-
scribes internal GI protection in the United States and the EC. In Part IV, 
I explain what the United States could gain by adopting a European ap-
                                                                                                             
 9. Bob Davis, Italian Town Says British Butchers Just Can’t Cut It—In Parma Ham 
Spat, Tradition Collides With Commerce, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2002, at A1. 
 10. See Lina Montén, Comment, Geographical Indications of Origin: Should They Be 
Protected and Why?—An Analysis of the Issue From the U.S. and EU Perspectives, 22 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 315, 342 (2006). 
 11. James Cox, What’s in a Name?, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 2003, at 1B. 
 12. See Montén, supra note 10, at 339. 
 13. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art 22(1), 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter 
TRIPS]. 
 14. Philippe Zylberg, Geographical Indications v. Trademarks: The Lisbon Agree-
ment: A Violation of TRIPS?, 11. U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 1 (2002). 
 15. Montén, supra note 10, at 339. Since 2002, Kraft has been forced to sell its prod-
uct under another name in Europe (“Pamessello Cheese”) in order to comply with the 
EC’s internal GI requirements. Id. 
 16. See Zylberg, supra note 14, at 1. 
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proach to the protection of GIs. Part V illustrates how a comprehensive 
and multilateral form of GI protection could be provided. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF GI PROTECTION 
International commerce has long placed significant importance upon 
geographical names.17 For many centuries, products have been advertised 
and sold based upon the name of the specific region in which they origi-
nated.18 Traditionally, products such as Bordeaux wine and Darjeeling 
tea have been in high demand, commanding premium prices.19 Due to 
existing consumer preferences, these GIs are market assets.20 As interna-
tional commerce continued to expand after the Industrial Revolution, 
businesses and developed countries’ governments became concerned 
with the protection of GIs in international markets.21 
A. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
The Paris Convention, concluded in 1883, was the first multilateral 
agreement to cover GIs.22 Although the Paris Convention now has 172 
contracting parties,23 its protection of GIs is limited.24 The Paris Conven-
tion protects indications of source and appellations of origin.25 In modern 
terminology, a GI encompasses both of these terms.26 However, a major 
deficiency of the Paris Convention is its failure to define indications of 
source and appellations of origin.27 Furthermore, the Paris Convention 
does not specify what makes a representation of origin false.28 
                                                                                                             
 17. JACQUES AUDIER, TRIPS AGREEMENT: GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 10 (2000). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Id. at 11. 
 23. WIPO, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Contracting 
Parties, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/paris.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
 24. See Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About 
Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 311 (2006). 
 25. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 2, Mar. 20, 1883, 
828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020. 
html [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 26. AUDIER, supra note 17, at 11. An indication of source is merely intended to des-
ignate where a product comes from. Id. However, an appellation of origin is more spe-
cific in that it denotes certain qualities and characteristics. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
AND POLICY 317 (2001). 
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Article 10 of the Paris Convention allows for the seizure of imported 
goods “in cases of direct or indirect use of a false indication of the source 
of the goods.”29 Article 10 does not provide protection against mislead-
ing indications that are not technically false.30 Misleading indications, 
however, have the potential to deceive consumers; thus, their exclusion 
from article 10 was a major shortcoming for GI protection under the 
Paris Convention.31 Although article 10bis was later added to prohibit 
acts of unfair competition that mislead the public with respect to the na-
ture of goods,32 U.S. opposition prevented the application of this provi-
sion to GIs.33 Consequently, despite the inclusion of article 10bis, the 
Paris Convention fails to prohibit misleading indications of origin.34 
B. The Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indi-
cations of Source on Goods 
In 1891, just eight years after the Paris Convention, the Madrid Agree-
ment expanded protection by prohibiting products with false and decep-
tive indications of origin.35 However, the Madrid Agreement does not 
protect generic terms and allows national courts to determine which indi-
cations of origin are generic.36 As a result, with the exception of wine, 
which is specifically excluded from generic treatment by article 4,37 na-
tional courts have been free to develop different approaches to the Ma-
drid Agreement and often have provided limited protection for foreign 
GIs.38 Moreover, the small number of signatories (thirty-five) has limited 
                                                                                                             
 29. Paris Convention art. 10. 
 30. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 264 (2001). 
 31. Id. 
 32. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 28, at 317–18. Article 10bis was added during the 
1958 Lisbon Revision Conference. Id. at 318. 
 33. As originally proposed, Article 10bis(3) provided: “Indications or allegations, the 
use of which in the course of trade is liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the 
origin, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose or 
the quantity of the goods.” Id. The United States vetoed the words “the origin,” a refer-
ence to geographical indications, because they would have raised too many issues with 
respect to U.S. law. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of 
Source on Goods art. 1, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 163, available at http://www. 
wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/madrid/trtdocs_wo032.html. 
 36. AUDIER, supra note 17, at 11. 
 37. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 28, at 318. 
 38. Jim Chen, A Sober Second Look at Appellations of Origin: How the United States 
Will Crash France’s Wine and Cheese Party, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 29, 41 (1996). 
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the scope of the international GI protection the Madrid Agreement pro-
vides.39 
C. The Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin 
and Their International Registration 
Europe has been the driving force behind international GI protection. 
Thus, there was little progress on the matter while the continent endured 
World War I, an economic depression coupled with protectionist trade 
policies, and World War II.40 However, once Europe recovered from 
World War II, GI protection reemerged as a priority and underwent an-
other round of changes. 
The Lisbon Agreement, which was concluded in 1958, represented a 
significant advance of GI protection.41 Seventy-five years after the Paris 
Convention, the Lisbon Agreement finally defined an appellation of ori-
gin as “the geographical name of a country, region, or locality, which 
serves to designate a product originating therein, the quality and charac-
teristics of which are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical 
environment, including natural and human factors.”42 One key provision 
is article 6, which provides that a GI protected in one country can never 
become generic in another country.43 The Lisbon Agreement also ex-
tends protection to false GIs in translated form and prohibits the use of 
indications paired with approximation terms.44 
The Lisbon Agreement only protects GIs to the extent they are pro-
tected in the country of origin.45 As a result, the impact of the Lisbon 
Agreement’s GI protection is limited because many national legislatures 
have been unwilling to enact legislation enforcing added GI protection.46 
The lack of any restriction in article 6 on the classification of generic 
terms as GIs has also caused countries to be wary of joining the Lisbon 
                                                                                                             
 39. See WIPO, Treaties and Contracting Parties, Madrid Agreement, http://www. 
wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year=1884&end_year=200
7&search_what=C&treaty_id=3 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008); AUDIER, supra note 17, at 
11–12. 
 40. See Arcelia Quintana-Adriano, Legal Mercantile Evolution from the Twentieth 
Century to the Dawning of the Twenty-first Century, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 831, 832 (2007). 
 41. AUDIER, supra note 17, at 11. 
 42. Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their Interna-
tional Registration art. 2(1), Oct. 31, 1958, 923 U.N.T.S. 205, available at http://www. 
wipo.int/lisbon/en/legal_texts/lisbon_agreement.htm [hereinafter Lisbon Agreement]. 
 43. Id. art. 6. 
 44. AUDIER, supra note 17, at 11. 
 45. WATAL, supra note 30, at 265. 
 46. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 28, at 319. 
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Agreement.47 Consequently, despite having been open to membership 
worldwide, there are only twenty-six contracting parties to the Lisbon 
Agreement.48 
II. TRIPS PROVISIONS ON GIS  
A. The Foundation of TRIPS and the Establishment of its GI Provisions 
In the decades following the Lisbon Agreement, counterfeiting, imita-
tion, and use of false indications of origin expanded.49 As a result, the EC 
was determined to enhance GI protection during the Uruguay Round.50 
Unlike other IP topics negotiated during the Uruguay Round, the battle 
over GIs was not between developed countries on one side and develop-
ing and less developed countries on the other.51 Instead, it was a battle 
primarily between “new world” countries such as the United States, Can-
ada, Australia, and many Latin American countries and “old world” 
countries in Europe.52 
In obvious self-interest, European countries, acting through the EC, 
sought to expand protection for GIs.53 However, the new world countries, 
which also happened to be some of the world’s leading agricultural ex-
porters, also acted in self-interest by opposing the expansion of GI pro-
tection.54 The new world countries asserted that the terms immigrants 
brought with them from Europe had become generic and should not be 
protected since the terms were no longer associated with the regions in 
which they had originated.55 The battle over GIs, particularly disagree-
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. 
 48. See WIPO, Treaties and Contracting Parties, Lisbon Agreement, http://www. 
wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year=1884&end_year=200
7&search_what=C&treaty_id=10; AUDIER, supra note 17, at 11–12. 
 49. AUDIER, supra note 17, at 12. 
 50. See GATT Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Guidelines Proposed by the European 
Community for the Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/16 (Nov. 20, 1987) [hereinafter Guidelines Proposed by the 
EC]; GATT Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Submissions from Participants on Trade Problems 
Encountered in Connection with Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/7 
(May 29, 1987). 
 51. DINWOODIE ET AL, supra note 28, at 321–22. 
 52. Id.; Irene Calboli, Expanding the Protection of Geographical Indications of Ori-
gin Under TRIPS: “Old” Debate or “New” Opportunity?, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 181, 195 (2006). 
 53. See Guidelines Proposed by the EC, supra note 50. 
 54. See Montén, supra note 10, at 334. 
 55. Calboli, supra note 52, at 197–98. 
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ment over heightened protection for wines and spirits, proved to be one 
of the principal obstacles to the conclusion of TRIPS.56 Ultimately, a 
compromise was reached and TRIPS entered into force on January 1, 
1995 as a part of the WTO Agreement. In stark contrast to the Lisbon 
Agreement, the vast majority of the world’s countries have agreed to 
TRIPS.57 
TRIPS was drafted to promote harmonization in the IP realm. The 
benefit of such harmonization is that “reducing the disparities between 
national laws will reduce the cost, time, and uncertainty involved in de-
termining and/or acquiring rights, thus reducing barriers to innovation 
and to global trade.”58 Furthermore, TRIPS was intended to prevent three 
specific abuses of GIs: (1) the use of false or misleading GIs; (2) the reg-
istration of GIs as trademarks; and (3) the degeneration of GIs into ge-
neric terms.59 Although TRIPS has ambitious goals for GI protection, it 
provides minimum enforceable standards and does not “dictate the sys-
tem that WTO Members must implement to protect GIs.”60 
GI protection under TRIPS can be broken down into three generally 
stated topics. First, TRIPS requires that WTO members provide certain 
minimum protections for all GIs. Second, it affords an elevated level of 
protection to wines and spirits. Third, it defines certain special circum-
stances in which no protection is required. 
B. Article 22: General Protection 
Article 22 states the minimum protection that must be provided for all 
GIs.61 TRIPS defines GIs as “indications which identify a good as origi-
nating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that terri-
tory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good 
is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”62 TRIPS does not 
define the term “good.”63 However, even when the Paris Convention was 
                                                                                                             
 56. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 28, at 321–22. 
 57. There are 150 countries that are members of the WTO (there are 151 members, 
including the EC). WTO, Understanding the WTO, Members, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2008). 
 58. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Integration of International and Domestic Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 307, 308 (2000). 
 59. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 28, at 329. 
 60. Statement of Jon W. Dudas, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellec-
tual Property and Deputy Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www. 
ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/108f/dudas0722.htm. 
 61. Hughes, supra note 24, at 314. 
 62. TRIPS art. 22(1). 
 63. AUDIER, supra note 17, at 16. 
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concluded, it was accepted that IP rights attach to all kinds of products.64 
Thus, under TRIPS, GIs apply to all goods, whether they are natural, ag-
ricultural, or manufactured.65 
In order to establish a GI under TRIPS, “‘a given quality, reputation or 
characteristic’ must link the goods to their place of origin.”66 These at-
tributes may establish a good’s origin individually or in combination.67 
Thus, protection applies to GIs on goods even when the goods are only 
identified with an area by reputation.68 GIs are not limited to words; 
therefore, images and packaging could be classified as GIs.69 GIs do not, 
however, apply to services.70 
A complainant must satisfy three elements in order to establish the vio-
lation of a GI under article 22(2)(a), provided the good at issue is not a 
wine or spirit.71 First, the presentation of the good must suggest origina-
tion in a particular geographical area.72 Second, the good must not come 
from the region suggested by the indication of origin.73 Finally, the rep-
resentation of origin must be misleading.74 However, there are situations 
in which exceptions preclude GI protection even if the three-part test is 
satisfied. 
Article 22(4) ensures that a true but possibly deceptive indication may 
not diminish the value of a valid GI.75 For example, renaming the Napa 
Valley region “Burgundy” would not be permissible under article 
22(4).76 Article 22(4) also applies to geographical homonyms, which are 
prevalent in countries where immigrants have named new regions after 
those in their homeland.77 
C. Article 23: Extra Protection for Wines and Spirits 
Article 23 provides an additional layer of protection for wines and spir-
its. Regardless of consumer confusion, an inaccurate indication of origin 
                                                                                                             
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 17. 
 67. Id. 
 68. WATAL, supra note 30, at 267. 
 69. Hughes, supra note 24, at 314. 
 70. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 28, at 323. 
 71. Hughes, supra note 24, at 316. 
 72. TRIPS art. 22(2)(a). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 28, at 324. 
 76. Id. 
 77. AUDIER, supra note 17, at 22. 
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amounts to a per se violation of GI protection for wines and spirits.78 
Thus, a complainant only needs to satisfy two components under article 
23: the presentation of the good must suggest origination in a particular 
geographical area, and the good must not actually originate in that geo-
graphical area. Article 23 also provides wines and spirits with GI protec-
tion against GIs in translated form and indications of origin paired with 
approximation terms.79 
D. Article 24: Exceptions 
The scope of GI protection provided in articles 22 and 23 is curtailed 
by the exceptions in article 24.80 The first two exceptions are grandfather 
clauses. First, article 24(4) provides an exception to the protection of a 
GI for wines or spirits that originated in one country if the GI was “used . 
. . in a continuous manner” in another county either (1) for at least ten 
years before the date TRIPS was concluded (April 15, 1994), or (2) in 
good faith prior to the same date.81 Second, article 24(5) permits a coun-
try to avoid invalidating any trademark comprising a GI if rights in that 
trademark developed prior to (1) the date of TRIPS’s entry into force in 
that country, or (2) the protection of the GI in its country of origin.82 
Article 24(6) removes the obligations of articles 22 and 23 for terms 
that are generic.83 A term is generic if “the relevant indication is identical 
with the term customary in common language as the common name for 
such goods or services in the territory of that Member.”84 This exception 
exists when a geographical term is identified with a particular product as 
opposed to a geographical area because consumers do not perceive a link 
between the product and the identified region.85 Each member country 
determines whether a term is generic (for its internal protection of GIs) 
based upon the term’s customary usage within that country.86 This prac-
tice allows for considerable deterioration of GI protection.87 The United 
States, for example, has made considerable use of article 24(6) in its de-
nial of GI protection.88 
                                                                                                             
 78. TRIPS art. 23(1). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 28, at 327–29. 
 81. TRIPS art. 24(4). 
 82. Id. art. 24(5). 
 83. Id. art. 24(6). 
 84. Id. 
 85. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 28, at 324. 
 86. See TRIPS art. 24(6). 
 87. See WATAL, supra note 30, at 270. 
 88. Id. at 270–71. 
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Article 24(9) states that members are not obligated to protect GIs that 
are not protected in their country of origin.89 Thus, if a GI is not pro-
tected in its home country, the GI’s protection under TRIPS is optional.90 
However, the existence of GI protection at home does not automatically 
create a right to protection in other countries.91 
E. The Debate over Future Negotiations 
The TRIPS provisions for GIs represent a hard-fought compromise that 
leave many issues unresolved.92 Both the United States and the EC were 
unwilling to budge in the GI debate.93 In order to overcome disagree-
ments and enact TRIPS, these parties agreed to several statements in the 
GI provisions that obligate members to negotiate certain matters in the 
future.94 This was an acceptable compromise under which the United 
States did not have to concede too much ground to the EC, and the EC 
was assured of built-in negotiations during which it could work towards 
expanding GI protection.95 
Three provisions of TRIPS require future negotiations on GIs. First, ar-
ticle 23(4) requires member states to negotiate “the establishment of a 
multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indi-
cations for wines.”96 Second, article 24(1) expressly obligates countries 
to “enter into negotiations aimed at increasing the protection of individ-
ual geographical indications under article 23.”97 Members may not use 
the exceptions in article 24(4)–(8) as a pretext for refusing to participate 
in negotiations.98 Third, article 24(2) calls for a continual review of the 
implementation of the TRIPS GI provisions, including negotiations on a 
multilateral registration system for wines and on increased protection for 
individual GIs.99 
Currently, there are two primary points of contention regarding GIs: 
(1) establishing a multilateral register for wines and spirits, and (2) ex-
tending the higher level of protection afforded to wines and spirits under 
                                                                                                             
 89. TRIPS art. 24(9). 
 90. AUDIER, supra note 17, at 19. This is a major shortcoming of TRIPS because 
many less developed countries do not have the capacity to protect their GIs and will fail 
to gain protection as a result of this provision. See id. 
 91. Id. at 20. 
 92. See Calboli, supra note 52, 189–90. 
 93. Id. at 182–83. 
 94. See Hughes, supra note 24, at 301. 
 95. See id. 
 96. TRIPS art. 23(4). 
 97. Id. art. 24(1). 
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. art. 24(2). 
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article 23 to other goods.100 The EC supports extensive GI protection 
through a wine registry and would like to extend article 23’s protection 
beyond wines and spirits.101 The United States disputes both positions.102 
1. Creating a Multilateral Register for Wines 
Concerning the establishment of a multilateral register for wines, the 
EC submitted a detailed proposal (“EC Proposal”) in June 2005 that 
called for an amendment to TRIPS by means of an annex to article 
23(4).103 The EC Proposal recommends a presumption of GI protection 
for registered products.104 However, this presumption would not exist in 
countries that lodged a reservation based on permitted grounds105 and 
within a specified period.106 
In response to the EC Proposal, the United States and sixteen other 
countries107 submitted a “Joint Proposal” document.108 These countries 
did not want to amend TRIPS.109 Instead, they proposed enacting a sys-
tem in which notified GIs would be registered in a database and countries 
would have the option to participate in the system.110 Participating mem-
bers would have to consult the database in their protection of GIs.111 
Non-participating members would be encouraged but not obliged to con-
                                                                                                             
 100. WTO, Geographical Indications, Background and the Current Situation, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPs_e/gi_background_e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 
2008) [hereinafter WTO, Geographical Indications]; WTO, Geographical Indications: 
Communication from the European Communities, TN/IP/W/11 (June 14, 2005). 
 101. THOMAS COTTIER, TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN WTO 
LAW 486 (2005). 
 102. See id. at 488. 
 103. WTO, Geographical Indications, supra note 100. 
 104. COTTIER, supra note 101, at 487. 
 105. WTO, Geographical Indications, supra note 100. 
 106. Failure to make a reservation within this timeframe would act as a statute of limi-
tations, preventing a country from refusing protection after the term was registered. See 
id. 
 107. The other countries were Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Namibia, 
New Zealand, Philippines, and Chinese Taipei. COTTIER, supra note 101, at 488 n.145. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Proposal for a 
Multilateral System for Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications for 
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sult the database.112 Presumably, some countries would elect not to par-
ticipate. 
Hong Kong entered a “Compromise Proposal” under which a regis-
tered term would have a less extensive presumption than under the EC 
Proposal.113 The presumption, however, would apply solely in those 
countries that elected to participate in this compromise system.114 There-
fore, the Compromise Proposal suffers from the same opt-out limitation 
as the Joint Proposal. Despite the Compromise Proposal, no compromise 
has been achieved, and it does not appear that any compromise is immi-
nent.115 
The EC Proposal is the best option. As mentioned above, article 23(4) 
calls for negotiating “the establishment of a multilateral system of notifi-
cation and registration of geographical indications for wines.”116 It would 
be against the letter and spirit of TRIPS to settle for the creation a regis-
ter that could be opted out of by several of the largest economies. In-
stead, article 23(4) should be interpreted to encourage its members to 
create a binding registration system that affords full protection for the 
GIs of wines. 
2. Extending the Higher Level of Protection for Wines and Spirits to 
Other Goods 
While article 23(4) sets forth a negotiations agenda, it does not call for 
negotiations on the expansion of protection outside of wines and spir-
its.117 The EC claims that TRIPS requires negotiations on including high-
quality products in a multilateral register.118 Moreover, the EC argues 
that the Doha Declaration provides a mandate for such negotiations.119 
Although there may be arguments in favor of expanding article 23’s pro-
tections beyond wines and spirits, there is insufficient support for the 
EC’s position.120 
Prior to the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference, the EC introduced a 
list of forty-one geographical terms for which it sought TRIPS protection 
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as non-generic GIs.121 This list—which contained many famous names of 
cheeses and wines, such as Gorgonzola, Mozzarella, Bordeaux, and 
Champagne—was characterized by the EC as a “recuperation” of the 
names.122 However, it is informally known as the “claw back” list.123 Ul-
timately, the Cancun Ministerial Conference collapsed under unrelated 
matters124 and no progress was made on GIs. Regardless, it is unlikely 
the United States would have agreed to the claw back list.125 
III. U.S. AND EC PROTECTION OF GIS 
The vastly different ways in which the United States and the EC ap-
proach IP rights exacerbates the GI debate. The U.S. IP system is driven 
primarily by an economic philosophy that gives inventors an incentive to 
create by allowing them to gain financial rewards by protecting their 
works.126 Meanwhile, in relation to the United States, EC IP law empha-
sizes natural rights and the “importance of reputation and noneconomic 
aspects of intellectual property.”127 
A. U.S. Protection of GIs 
1. U.S. Protection of Foodstuffs 
Within the United States, GIs are protected by trademarks.128 Trade-
marks are part of the United States’ unfair competition law, within which 
the Lanham Act is the primary statute governing GI protection of food-
stuffs.129 The Lanham Act defines a trademark as “any word, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . used by a person . . . to 
identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or 
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.”130 
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There are two key objectives of the U.S. trademark system: the protec-
tion of merchants and manufacturers who are legitimate trademark hold-
ers, and the protection of consumers.131 Legitimate trademark holders 
need protection against misappropriation, which arises when other par-
ties attempt to sell their products as if they were produced by the trade-
mark holder.132 U.S. trademark law is designed to protect consumers 
from confusion in the marketplace by ensuring they are not made to be-
lieve that unrelated products actually come from the same producer.133 
Although the U.S. trademark system does provide GIs with protection, 
this protection is lost if the trademark becomes generic.134 A trademark is 
generic when it “ceases to serve its function of identifying the source 
(and quality) of the product or service.”135 Once a trademark becomes 
generic, it can be used to describe any good with similar qualities or 
characteristics.136 
2. U.S. Protection of Wines and Spirits  
The United States affords higher protection for wines and spirits under 
the system of “certificates of label approval” governed by the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”).137 The ATF label-
ing provisions “prevent deception of the consumer, . . . provide the con-
sumer with adequate information as to the identity and quality of the 
product, and . . . prohibit false or misleading statements.”138 ATF allows 
producers to use generic terms with impunity; ATF provisions are like-
wise lenient with “semi-generic” terms, as long as the label also indicates 
the true appellation of origin.139 The allowance for semi-generic terms, 
which includes Champagne, Port, and Chablis, is particularly maddening 
for EC wine producers.140 
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Both the Lanham Act and the ATF provisions have significant loop-
holes that allow the United States to avoid strong enforcement of GI pro-
tection.141 The EC has urged the United States to eliminate these loop-
holes, which allow the alleged misappropriation of European GIs.142 
B. EC Protection of GIs 
Rather than using trademarks to cover GI protection, the EC provides 
protection specifically geared to GIs.143 Trademarks and GIs often over-
lap and perform similar functions.144 However, a registered trademark 
does not always provide protection that is coextensive with that of a reg-
istered GI. Trademarks grant monopolistic IP rights to a single owner.145 
In contrast, GIs grant protection to all of the qualified goods produced 
within a particular geographical region.146 For example, rather than being 
owned by a single entity, as would be the case with a trademark, the GI 
of Parmigiano-Reggiano is controlled by about six hundred producers of 
the cheese, all of which are located within a specific region of Italy.147 
Furthermore, the primary objective of GI measures in the EC is to assist 
the producer through protection of the economic value inherent in GIs,148 
unlike trademarks, which not only protect rights owners, but function to 
prevent consumer confusion.149 
1. EC Protection of Foodstuffs 
On July 14, 1992, through Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92 
(“Regulation 2081/92”), the EC established a register for agricultural 
products and foodstuffs that qualify for GI protection.150 Regulation 
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2081/92 extends to foodstuffs produced and processed in a particular 
region.151 
Registration of a GI in the EC requires national recognition of the GI 
and subsequent verification by the European Commission.152 Generic 
terms may not be registered in the EC.153 The entire EC decides whether 
a candidate GI is generic.154 Once a GI is registered, all producers within 
the particular region who meet certain standards are granted the right to 
associate the GI with their products.155 In the EC, prior trademarks do not 
enjoy primacy over GIs, as provided for by the grandfather clause in arti-
cle 24(5) of TRIPS.156 Rather, a trademark and a GI for the same term 
may co-exist.157 
Regulation 2081/92 grants extensive power to GI holders to prohibit all 
practices that take unjustified advantage of a GI’s reputation.158 Conse-
quently, the EC’s GI protection is stronger and more specifically tied to 
geographical terms than U.S. trademark law. This stronger protection 
reflects European cultural values, and the national pride and traditions of 
European citizens.159 
2. EC Protection of Wines and Spirits 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2392/89 (“Regulation 2392/89”) pro-
tects the use of GIs for wines and spirits.160 It prohibits the use of label-
ing that is “incorrect or likely to cause confusion” about origin.161 Regu-
lation 2392/89 also prevents the unauthorized use of GIs, and places GI 
protection above regular trademark protection.162 It has not been the sub-
ject of much controversy.163 
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C. The Budweiser Case 
The Budweiser Case, the leading WTO case on GIs, involved a Czech 
brewer, Budejovicky Budvar, who fought against Anheuser-Busch Com-
panies’ (“Anhesuer-Busch”) use of the trademark “Budweiser” within 
the EC.164 Budejovicky Budvar brewed a beer under the EC-registered 
GI “Budejovicky,” the name of a Czech town. The German translation 
for Budejovicky is “Budweiser.”165 Since translations of GIs are pro-
tected under Regulation 2081/92,166 the EC argued that Anheuser-Busch 
could no longer use the name “Budweiser” within the EC.167 The United 
States countered by arguing that its trademark had been in existence prior 
to the registration of the “Budejovicky” GI, and that its existing trade-
mark rights within the EC should not be undermined by a subsequent 
GI.168 
Interestingly, when the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) ren-
dered its decision on March 15, 2005, both the EC and the United States 
claimed victory.169 The DSB panel concluded that Anheuser-Busch could 
continue to use its “Budweiser” trademark in the EC.170 Furthermore, the 
panel recommended that the EC amend Regulation 2081/92 to render it 
TRIPS compliant by allowing equal registration access for foreign GIs.171 
Despite these case-specific adverse holdings, it appears the EC gained 
the more favorable holding on GI policy.172 The DSB holding substanti-
ated the EC’s underlying assertion that heightened GI protection for agri-
cultural products is permissible on an international level.173 Furthermore, 
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the panel stated that article 24(5) allows for the coexistence of trade-
marks and GIs, and acts as the “boundary” between trademarks and 
GIs.174 
IV. WHAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT LOSE AND WHAT IT STANDS 
TO GAIN 
Unfortunately, the United States has not been inclined to make conces-
sions to the EC on GIs.175 However, the downside to enhanced GI protec-
tion is not as great as the United States has claimed, and there are several 
ways the United States would benefit from enhanced GI protection. 
A. The Potential Losses Are Exaggerated 
Although the United States has presented a parade of horribles to de-
scribe the effects of strong GI protection,176 it is important to note that 
the United States does have valid concerns about the expansion of GI 
protection, particularly for terms already considered generic in the 
United States. Concerns about consumer confusion and increased mar-
keting and labeling costs are warranted. Likewise, U.S. producers are 
reasonably concerned that Europeans would be able to free ride on dec-
ades of marketing and product name familiarity generated by American 
companies.177 However, these concerns are often taken too far with 
claims that strong GI protection would result in EC producers’ monopo-
lization of GI products178 and “create gridlock and confusion in U.S. su-
permarket aisles.”179 Therefore, before delving into ways in which the 
United States would benefit from enhanced GI protection, it is necessary 
to demonstrate how the United States has exaggerated the losses that 
would result from such protection. 
1. The Transition Period 
 The harm from consumer confusion and lost sales would be 
mitigated by allowing companies sufficient time to adjust the names of 
their GI-infringing products. For example, the EC provides for transi-
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tional periods of between five and fifteen years.180 This additional time 
would allow companies to sell the remainder of their GI-infringing prod-
ucts, come up with new product names, and design new product labels. 
Furthermore, companies could also make use of this time by reeducating 
the public as to the name of their products through advertising and prod-
uct labeling.181 In short, a transition period would mitigate the harmful 
effects of enhanced GI protection by allowing consumers and producers 
to adjust. 
2. The One-Time Cost 
The amount of harm that would result from increased GI protection 
would also be limited because the re-naming of a product would only 
occur once.182 After producers adjusted to the enhanced protection for 
GIs, the costs would not recur.183 Although the adjustment costs could be 
significant, they would not necessarily amount to a loss in market share, 
which would be much more debilitating. 
3. The Existence of Other Factors for Product Identification 
A product’s name is far from the be-all, end-all of product identifica-
tion. Other factors, such as the product’s packaging, labeling, store 
placement, and actual appearance, can be key determinants in helping a 
consumer locate a specific product. For example, a consumer could still 
find Kraft Parmesan Cheese by looking for a green cylindrical can with a 
“Kraft” label near the spaghetti and spaghetti sauce, regardless of 
whether the can actually says “Parmesan Cheese” on it. Moreover, the 
product composition itself would remain the same, so consumer satisfac-
tion would not be compromised. 
4. The Advantage of Low-Priced Goods Would Persist 
Even with strong GI enforcement measures, domestic companies’ 
mass-produced items would still enjoy economies of scale and accompa-
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nying price advantages over European GI-protected products.184 Thus, 
another limitation on the parade of horribles argument is that many con-
sumers would still choose to purchase the lower-priced, non-GI-
protected product.185 Furthermore, it is not a given that GI protection 
amounts to increased market share.186 For example, despite the fact that 
eighty-five percent of French wine exports incorporate protectable GIs, 
in the past few years, French wines have lost market share in North 
America and the United Kingdom to countries with much weaker GI pro-
tection. 187 
5. The Administrative Costs Are Exaggerated 
U.S. policymakers have also argued that the extra administrative costs 
for a GI system would be too high.188 However, the United States has 
exaggerated the burden that such costs would impose. The administrative 
costs “would be negligible in comparison with the costs of implementing 
the obligations of the Uruguay Round.”189 These additional administra-
tive costs complained of by the United States are normal for any multi-
lateralization of IP rights and are no different from what the United 
States expects many other countries to spend on IP enforcement matters. 
6. The Monopoly Concerns Are Unreasonable 
Concerns that extended GI protection would result in EC monopoliza-
tion of certain items are unreasonable.190 Although a region’s producers 
would gain an oligopoly over the name embodied in a GI,191 non-regional 
producers could continue producing the same products they now offer.192 
“Rather than leading to monopoly, consumers would be free to choose 
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between a product from a given region with a given GI, and a similar 
product that does not originate from the same region.”193 Such a scenario 
would be good for competition and allow products to “compete on their 
own merits.”194 
B. Benefits to the United States 
The United States often focuses on the economic losses that would re-
sult from enhanced GI protection.195 Rarely, however, does the United 
States acknowledge the domestic benefits that would arise from en-
hanced GI protection. 
1. Creation of GI Assets 
a. Worldwide Protection of Existing GIs 
If the scope of TRIPS were expanded, existing U.S. products such as 
Florida oranges, Idaho potatoes, Vidalia onions, and Washington State 
apples would gain international protection.196 This would certainly be 
preferable to the existing international protection of U.S. GIs. As indi-
cated earlier, TRIPS often provides limited protection or no protection at 
all for GIs.197 
b. Creation of New GIs 
In addition to protecting existing GIs, many regions within the United 
States could establish and register their own new GIs.198 Thus what is 
often perceived as a competitive disadvantage could actually develop 
into a fertile opportunity.199 GIs would be particularly useful for U.S. 
food producers due to their creation of a sense of place.200 Because a GI 
is indicative of the place from which it derives, it imparts notions of 
quality and locality to the products it is attached to, distinguishing those 
products from mass-produced alternatives.201 Moreover, GIs capitalize 
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on the consumer trend of purchasing “lower volume niche or specialty 
products” in lieu of commonplace, mass-produced items.202 
The Australian wine industry exemplifies the benefits of creating new 
GIs.203 Australia signed a bilateral agreement with the EC in 1994 and 
agreed to stop using European regional names to describe wines.204 
Rather than decreasing the competitiveness of Australian wine, the 
agreement led to “the making of the Australian wine industry.”205 Austra-
lia relied on its own regional names and product quality to become “the 
world’s most dynamic wine industry.”206 In the 1990s, Australia’s wine 
exports boomed, growing five-fold over the course of the decade. 
2. GI Protection as a Bargaining Chip 
It may be unrealistic to expect the United States to agree with the EC’s 
position on GIs without the United States receiving some sort of imme-
diate benefit. A monetary contribution to the United States and other 
similarly situated countries would likely be cost prohibitive.207 Rather 
than pressing for a payment scheme, the United States should consider 
fully adopting the EC’s position on GI matters in exchange for signifi-
cant reductions in the EC’s agricultural subsidies and tariff rates. In 
short, if the EC is truly serious about GI protection, at minimum it should 
agree with the United States’ Portman Proposal to reduce EC agricultural 
tariffs and subsidies.208 The EC has received harsh criticism for its agri-
cultural protectionism and maintains an increasingly untenable posi-
tion.209 Likewise, the United States is much maligned for its opposition 
to GI expansion, as criticism of the United States is increasing among 
developing and less developed countries.210 Consequently, these points 
would be fertile ground for negotiation, concession, and agreement 
A U.S.-EC agreement could contemplate an IP-for-agriculture swap, 
not unlike the Uruguay Round’s “Grand Bargain.”211 Although GIs fall 
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within IP, they could easily be categorized under agriculture, because the 
majority of GIs involve the IP protection of agricultural products. Con-
sequently, a U.S.-EC agreement could actually be characterized as an 
agriculture-for-agriculture bargain. Such an agreement might be more 
palatable to national legislatures, because many of the same interests 
would be involved on both sides of the transaction. The EC, for its part, 
has already expressed interest in an exchange of GI protection for agri-
cultural liberalization.212 As a result, there is reason to hope that such an 
exchange could take place. 
3. One Less Dispute in the Doha Round 
The dispute over GIs is not the cause of the Doha Round’s stalled 
status.213 However, if an agreement could be reached over GIs, there 
would be one less dispute in the Doha Round. Even if the EC did not 
make concessions to the United States, an agreement on the expansion of 
GIs could generate much-needed goodwill within the Doha Round and 
contribute to the momentum that is necessary for the completion of trade 
round negotiations. The advancement of the Doha Round is vital for the 
United States’ economic health, as it is the country with the world’s larg-
est trading volume.214 
The United States should attempt to reach an agreement with the EC 
soon because other countries are increasingly siding with the EC.215 By 
reaching an agreement on GIs, the United States could avoid the costs 
associated with a protracted battle over the issue. Furthermore, a multi-
lateral GI framework could provide consistency and direction on GI mat-
ters. 
4. The United States Could Increase its Credibility in the IP Realm 
The United States is one of the strongest proponents for the develop-
ment and enforcement of international IP rights protection.216 Mean-
while, the United States opposes the expansion of GI protection.217 Con-
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tinued resistance by the United States may send mixed signals to other 
countries regarding the U.S. commitment to international IP rights.218 
Developing and less developed countries may begin to believe that the 
United States only seeks to multilateralize and enforce IP rights that pro-
tect its own economic interests.219 However, if the United States were to 
concede to an IP measure it had argued was contrary to its interests, the 
United States could gain some credibility with other countries in its push 
for IP protection. 
5. Improved Consumer Choice 
Enhanced GI protection would allow U.S. consumers to make fully in-
formed decisions about the products they purchase.220 Additionally, accu-
rate labels guaranteeing the product’s origin would protect consumers.221 
For example, a consumer purchasing Feta cheese could be completely 
confident that they had bought the authentic Greek cheese made from 
sheep’s milk, as opposed to an American cheese actually derived from 
cow’s milk. Furthermore, as WTO Director-General (former European 
Trade Commissioner) Pascal Lamy noted, GIs “stimulate quality and 
consequently strengthen competitiveness.”222 
V. ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE GI FRAMEWORK  
The extension of GI protection under TRIPS would be a complex proc-
ess.223 In order to more easily conceptualize the process, negotiations for 
enhanced GI protection can be viewed as comprising three steps: first, 
establishing a multilateral register for wines and narrowing the article 24 
exceptions; second, extending the protections for wines and spirits under 
article 23 to other goods; and third, including all GIs in the multilateral 
register. Although these three steps are discussed in the ideal chronologi-
cal order, with some hard work, all of them could be completed within 
the Doha Round, provided it does not collapse.224 
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In order to secure expanded protection for GIs, the United States would 
need to completely overhaul its negotiation strategy. Instead of dodging 
the issue or downplaying the importance of GI protection, the United 
States should portray GIs as a viable form of IP that must be protected. 
In doing so, the United States should attempt to garner support from 
other countries, especially current GI expansion opponents Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, and Canada, to join in the shift to the pro-GI expansion 
group. The United States should provide a reasonable and accurate sum-
mary of losses that would be likely to arise from expanded GI protection, 
rather than the exaggerated claims which have typically been ad-
vanced.225 U.S. representatives would have to remain consistent in these 
efforts throughout the three-step process described below. 
A. Step One: Establishing a Multilateral Register for Wines and Paring 
Down the Exceptions of  Article 24 
The first step would be the creation of a multilateral register for wines. 
This is the most reasonable point from which to launch the expansion of 
GI protection since proposals have already been submitted on the topic. 
Furthermore, the creation of a multilateral register for wines is expressly 
provided for under TRIPS and would not require an amendment. The 
register could be modeled after the 2005 EC Proposal. 
In order to establish strong GI protection, article 24’s exceptions and 
limitations would have to be pared down. It would be ideal to complete 
this during the first step of negotiations in order to provide substance to 
the wine register and the subsequent enhancements of GI protection. The 
provisions within article 24(4)–(6) exclude several products with signifi-
cant commercial value from GI protection. Consequently, this would be 
the most controversial sub-issue in GI negotiations. 
The grandfather clauses of article 24(4)–(5) would need to be elimi-
nated. Otherwise, TRIPS would be authorizing a form of IP adverse pos-
session in which some of the most exploited GIs would not be cov-
ered.226 With regard to generic GIs, TRIPS should be altered to adopt the 
Lisbon Agreement’s bar on genericism for any GI protected within the 
territory of any WTO member.227 
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B. Step Two: Extending the Protection of Article 23 
The second step would be to amend TRIPS so that the extra protection 
wines and spirits receive would be provided to all other GIs. In 2002, 
thirty-seven countries supported a proposal to the WTO aimed at expand-
ing the extra protection of article 23 to all GIs,228 reflecting a broad base 
of support for such an expansion. Furthermore, this would be an appro-
priate second step because article 23’s provisions would not require any 
complicated amendments. In short, the terminology of article 23 could 
apply in toto to all GIs, rather than just wines and spirits. 
In expanding enhanced GI protection to include other goods, it is im-
portant to consider the boundaries of GI protection. For example, would 
restaurant menus be barred from describing a dish as “Prosciutto di 
Parma” if the ham was actually from Canada? Arguably, GI protection 
should include restaurant menu items because the exact same concerns 
regarding IP right infringement that exist within a grocery store are pre-
sent in a restaurant. However, restaurant names, such as Olive Garden 
Italian Restaurant or Carlos O’Kelly’s Mexican Café, should generally 
be excluded from GI protection because descriptive terms encompassing 
broad culinary traditions do not embody the specific reputational charac-
teristics that are the essence of GI protection. 
C. Step Three: Extending the Multilateral Register to All GIs with a 
Built-In Transitional Period 
Logically, the next step would be to expand the register beyond wines. 
This expansion would be facilitated by the existing wine register because 
the newly registered GIs could simply be incorporated into it. Conse-
quently, the many issues involving registration would not have to be re-
hashed. Moreover, if article 23’s GI protection were expanded to all GIs, 
an all-inclusive registration system would be optimal. 
Once this multilateral register for all GIs was established, a transitional 
period to allow infringing producers time to alter their products’ names 
to accommodate newly registered enhanced GIs should be provided. 
Much like the implementation of the existing GI system within the EC, a 
five to fifteen-year adjustment period would be appropriate for devel-
oped countries to transition.229 Due to the burden of the adjustment and 
its corresponding administrative costs, developing and less developed 
countries should be provided with longer transition periods. 
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CONCLUSION 
The foregoing examination of the GI stalemate between the United 
States and the EC prompts two main conclusions. First, the current posi-
tion of the United States is unsustainable. The world is increasingly rec-
ognizing the significant IP rights entailed by GIs. Accordingly, there is 
mounting pressure on the United States to agree to an expansion of GI 
protection. Second, the United States could actually benefit from 
stronger GI protection. Rather than focusing on the long-term benefits 
that GI protection could afford, U.S. negotiation efforts have been short-
sighted and focused almost exclusively on the economic losses that 
would result. 
Based upon the two conclusions mentioned above, it would be in the 
best interests of the United States to adopt a European approach to GIs. 
“To characterize the U.S.-EU trade relationship as anything less than the 
most important bilateral alliance in international trade would be a gross 
understatement.”230 Thus, the U.S.-EC agreement I have hypothesized 
would be a step in the right direction. With some luck, it could just be the 
missing ingredient in the incomplete recipe that is the Doha Round. 
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